The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints by Daniela Grieco
Liuc Papers n. 207, Serie Economia e Impresa, 54, ottobre 2007 
 
1 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION: 




In a 1954’s work, Schumpeter defined the entrepreneur as ‘the pivot on which everything 
turns’. Nowadays, scholars claim that this is the “era of the entrepreneur” (Goffee and Scase, 
1987): governments have become more focused on the determinants of entrepreneurship 
because small, new firms are perceived as a source of new jobs and ultimately as the mainspring 
of economic growth and development (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990). Many surveys and 
reviews have been written about entrepreneurship in the last twenty years (see among others 
Acs and Audretsch, 2003; Audretsch, 2002; Casson, 1982, 2003; Gartner, 1990; Glancey and 
McQuaid, 2000; Shane, 2000; Storey, 2000; Swedberg, 2000; Westhead and Wrigth, 2000) and 
a huge amount of conferences, workshops and debates have been devoted to this topic. The 
various existing interpretations and strands of research can be grouped in several ways. Among 
the others, Bull et al. (1996) suggest five broad categories: literature that is not directly 
concerned with the theory, but that focuses on the attempt of providing a definition for the word 
“entrepreneur”; analyses of the psychological traits of individuals defined as entrepreneurs; 
investigations on the formation of new ventures; studies on the strategies recognized as crucial 
to explain the success of business ventures; works on the environmental factors affecting 
entrepreneurial actions (see also Sorrentino, 2003). However, entrepreneurship is still “one of 
the most elusive and least understood forms of economic behaviour” (Eboli, 1997). This paper 
copes with one of the themes that did not receive much explicit attention in the existing works: 
the entrepreneurial decision. An exhaustive analysis of the peculiarities of the decision an 
individual makes when becoming entrepreneur has not been carried out yet. A lot of effort has 
been addressed to the way economic agents make their decisions, whereas no explicit study in 
this perspective has been dedicated to the entrepreneur. The aim of the paper is filling such a 
gap by looking at the entrepreneurial decision throughout the alternative approaches that 
literature in economics offers. The decision of becoming an entrepreneur can be understood in Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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its wholeness only if we consider the other meanings that this peculiar decision assumes. From 
the industrial organization point of view, the entrepreneurial decision corresponds to a firm’s 
entry into an industry. From a financial point of view, the entrepreneurial decision represents a 
specific case of real business investment. Finally, from a labour market point of view the 
entrepreneurial decision is the result of a specific career choice in favour of self-employment. 
Consequently, the paper will analyse not only works that explicitly speak of entrepreneurship, 
but also contributions that focus on entry, investment decisions concerning a new business and 
employment choices that are not concerned with a paid job. To accomplish such an endeavour, 
the existing literature on who is the entrepreneur and what are the peculiarities of his decision 
will be reorganized and integrated with the insights of those additional perspectives. The paper 
will show how the elements identified as determinants or constraints of the entrepreneurial 
decision according to these different strands of literature strongly depend on the specific 
perspectives each theory belongs to, and claims that a complete frame needs to account for all 
these contributions, that have specific pros and cons. Moreover, an attempt of classification of 
the entrepreneurial decision’s determinants according to their relatedness to the context where 
the entrepreneur operates or to his personal characteristics is carried out. 
2. Who is the entrepreneur and who he is not? 
Among the vast amount of definitions and characterizations that have emerged from studies 
across different disciplines (see Garavaglia and Grieco, 2005, for an exhaustive survey), this 
section focuses on studies about entrepreneurship belonging to the economic perspective. 
Who is the entrepreneur and what exactly does the entrepreneur do? To provide a clear 
specification, we start by delineating the peculiarities of the entrepreneur with respect to similar 
and related figures: the firm, the manager, the capitalist, and the professional. 
Classic economists and Marshall conceive the entrepreneur as the individual who primarily 
finances the firm, i.e. the owner that is simultaneously capitalist and manager. He is jointly the 
risk-bearer and the decision-maker, especially devoted to supervision and coordination. The 
entrepreneur is supposed to exercise control because of the power derived from his position in 
the ownership of the firm. Stauss (1944) claims that “the firm is the entrepreneur”, and the 
entrepreneur holds two fundamental responsibilities: “the assumption of risk” and “the 
assumption of management”. Nettl (1957), on the contrary, argues that entrepreneurship is a 
“fixed, if measurable, contribution to each firm”: the firm and the entrepreneur are not perfect 
synonymous for each other, and the former is identified with only a part of the latter, that cannot 
vary. The identification between the entrepreneur and the firm has become more debated since Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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firms’ average dimensions have increased and firms’ control has been shared among several 
individuals, as occurred in the last fifty years: scholars and practitioners have get interested in 
studying and better understanding “corporate entrepreneurship” and research on this topic has 
grown rapidly over the past decade. Nowadays, the entrepreneurial management school 
predominantly focuses on large corporate  firms and aims at individuating organizational 
structures that are efficient in exploiting opportunities and strategic management activities that 
assure competitive advantages over rivals. 
Moving to the characterization of the entrepreneur with respect of the other figures that 
operate within the firm, we recall Baumol (1968)’s contribution in emphasizing the 
entrepreneur’s position at “the apex of the hierarchy that determines the behaviour of the firm”. 
Furthermore, Baumol points out the necessity to distinguish between entrepreneurial and 
managerial functions. The manager can be defined as “the individual who oversees the ongoing 
efficiency of continuing processes”: he supervises the allocation of inputs, controls that 
schedules and contracts are respected, and makes decisions about pricing and advertising. In 
other words, the manager is in charge of routine activity. Conversely, the entrepreneur’s 
function concerns the development and the implementation of new ideas: he is “the 
Schumpeterian innovator”, but also “something more”. The literature has devoted a lot of work 
to this distinction: among the others, Martin (1982) argues that the essential difference between 
the entrepreneur and the manager is “perception”, and Kirzner (1983) emphasizes the fact that 
the entrepreneur perceives unmet needs concerning goods, services or new technologies. More 
recently, De Fraja (1996) presented a model of choice of the ownership composition where both 
structures (entrepreneurial firm or managerial firm) might emerge as the result of the 
interdependence between the individual’s effort and external economic conditions determined 
by technological factors (such as the capital investment needed to carry out the project) and by 
the level of uncertainty characterizing the project. De Fraja’s results show that the entrepreneur 
works harder than the manager when times are bad, and viceversa. 
Another issue to disentangle is related to the distinction between the entrepreneur and the 
capitalist. This dichotomy has been approached in different ways since the debate between 
Knight and Schumpeter. According to Knight (1921), bearing risk is an essential characteristic 
for an entrepreneur: capital markets provide too little financing due to moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, so that entrepreneurs have to finance themselves and sustain the risk of 
failure. On the other hand, Schumpeter (1936) separates the entrepreneurial function from the 
capitalist one: it is the capitalist who has to bear risk for the entrepreneur, whose aim is only to 
identify arbitrage opportunities in the economy. Subsequent empirical studies have tried to test 
both hypotheses, and a stronger support emerged in favour of Knight’s idea: Evans and Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
 
4 
Jovanovic (1989), among the others, reject Schumpeter’s view, because their results emphasize 
that entrepreneurs are significantly limited by capital stock availability. 
Finally, a further clarification should be carried on when discussing the composition of the 
human capital stock, that is determined both by entrepreneurs and professionals. Whereas 
professionals use their accumulated knowledge to facilitate economic transactions, 
entrepreneurs “provide the economy with new ideas, products, and way of doing things” (Iyigun 
and Owen, 1998), as already emphasized above. These two types of human capital should be 
treated as different and the relative importance of each type varies by activity: in Iyigun and 
Owen’s model, for example, entrepreneurial human capital is shown as relatively more 
important in intermediate-income countries, while professional human capital is relatively more 
abundant in richer economies. 
3. The entrepreneurial decision across the literature 
The distinction between entrepreneur and manager we have discussed above reflects the two 
types of functions - routine or non-routine functions - that have been ascribed to the 
entrepreneur across the economic though. Recent theories, however, tend to associate managers 
to routine functions and entrepreneurs to non-routine ones. Before going briefly through 
alternative approaches in economics and through the determinants they identify in motivating 
the entrepreneurial decision, we have to remember that such a ‘function-based’ definition for the 
entrepreneur is typical of the economic approach only; other disciplines’ look at 
entrepreneurship in different ways (see Garavaglia and Grieco, 2005, for a discussion). 
3.1. Routine decisions 
In mainstream models of the firm, the entrepreneur has the role of coordinator in a situation 
of resource scarcity: the economic concept of coordination represents the dynamic counterpart 
of the static idea of allocation and individuals are motivated to achieve private coordination that 
allows them to be better off as a result of reallocation. Coordination can be analysed from either 
a general or a partial point of view. General equilibrium studies are pure theoretical models of 
markets that work as instruments of resource allocation. In this context, the economic system is 
characterised by perfect knowledge and firms are considered as black-boxes, i.e. as means for 
transforming inputs into output. When the role of entrepreneurs is merely a function of 
coordination of resources, there is little room for a theory of entrepreneurship: basically, in 
equilibrium the existence of entrepreneurship is not required, being all resources organised and 
allocated efficiently by definition (Barreto, 1989). In this framework, there are modest Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
 
5 
possibilities for recognising the “proactive and dynamic behaviour of the type that is commonly 
associated to entrepreneurs” (Glancey and McQuaid, 2000). 
In this line of thinking, Leibenstein (1966; 1979) in his X-efficiency theory stresses the 
organizing function of the entrepreneur. The successful entrepreneur is the one who manages to 
minimise the inefficiencies that inevitably arise in the process of coordinating the factors of 
productions. The role of the entrepreneur is therefore to improve the efficiency of information 
flows in these markets, and to “gap-filling”, that is closely akin to the arbitrage function. 
Nonetheless, Leibenstein departs from the neoclassical theories because X-efficiency theory 
assumes that there are psychological costs in being fully rational. This limits the exploitation of 
all the opportunities available, and concretizes into incomplete contracts and possible 
disagreements about objectives among individuals. This type of approach implicitly assumes 
that the difference between simple arbitrage and the set up of a firm lies in the degree of 
complexity and in the type of contracts involved rather than in any difference of economic 
principle. In both cases, resources are reallocated, and if reallocation determines benefits for all 
agents, thereby “the entrepreneur stands to gain a pure entrepreneurial profit” (Ricketts, 2002). 
The idea that people start new ventures as a way to increase their personal wealth underlies this 
strand of research in entrepreneurship: the entrepreneur only coordinates resources, and the 
possibility of allocating these resources optimally represents the only determinant of the 
entrepreneurial decision. The neoclassical representation of the entrepreneur refers to an 
individual “who maximizes profit subject to various resources constraints” (Day and Sunder, 
1996). Factors such as firm’s revenues, profitability, the creation of personal wealth, revenues’ 
growth and sustainability are used as indicators of entrepreneurial success (Amit et al., 2000), 
and the criteria guiding the entrepreneurial decision making in the this literature are essentially 
expected profit maximization, expected utility of profit maximization, and maximization of 
firm’s stock market value (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). 
Entrepreneurship theories classified within this approach do not study the entrepreneurial 
choice explicitly, but nevertheless offer a general framework to analyze it. The lack such a 
perspective exhibits, however, lies in the fact that it appears too static and abstract, and does not 
pay enough attention to the entrepreneur as a decision maker. Subsequent approaches, still 
classifiable in the entrepreneurship literature but with a different idea about the type of functions 
an entrepreneur exercises, try to better disentangle the issue by looking at personal traits and 
delineating the peculiarities of an entrepreneur with respect to other economic agents. Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
 
6 
3.2. Non routine decisions 
Modern analyses of the entrepreneur develop Say’s insight that the organization of 
production and the combination of resource inputs require skills of a different order that those of 
routine labour. Scholars like Von Mises, Hayek, Schumpeter, Knight, Kirzner provide a 
characterization of the entrepreneur such that entrepreneurial function belongs to the sphere of 
non-routine decision making: entrepreneurial decisions are not sufficiently alike, and do not 
recur sufficiently often, to warrant the development of routine procedures. The absence of an 
active role for the entrepreneur in neoclassical economics directly derived on the assumption of 
market equilibrium: changes might occur, but variations were perfectly foreseen and 
expectations could never be disappointed. According to Knight, however, it is not change that 
gives rise to profits, but uncertainty and the possibility of incorrectness of expectations. 
Uncertainty stresses the entrepreneur’s willingness and ability to bear the responsibility for 
decision making: in particular, “Knightian uncertainty” refers to a situation where there is no 
factual experience to support the attachment of objective probabilities to the relevant random 
events (versus the case of risk, when probabilities can be assigned). If uncertainty characterizes 
the environment, the problem is no more represented by the actual execution of activity: the 
issue is deciding what to do and how to do it. This “primary function” is the entrepreneurial 
function: the endeavour of deciding how various objectives are to be achieved and of predicting 
which objectives are worth achieving competes to the entrepreneur, “a specialist who is 
prepared to bear the cost of uncertainty” (Knight, 1921). The exercise of entrepreneurship is 
usually associated with uncertainty bearing and has something to do with imperfect knowledge: 
recent theories especially emphasize that the entrepreneur does not merely deal with the 
consequences of imperfect knowledge, but rather concerns the rewards of discovering and using 
new knowledge. 
Grounding on Knight’s concept of the entrepreneur, Kihlstrom and Laffont build a 
competitive general equilibrium theory of the firm under uncertainty: as in Knight (1921), the 
entrepreneur’s function is twofold, and consists of “exercising responsible control” and 
“securing the owners of productive services against uncertainty and fluctuations in the income”. 
The entrepreneur provides managerial and organizational skills, facing the risk associated with 
the firm’s activity. Production requires both entrepreneurial and normal labour inputs; workers 
receive fixed wages, whereas entrepreneurs get risky profits; individuals decide the type of 
employment by comparing the risky returns of entrepreneurship to the level of wage emerging 
in the competitive labour market. Crucially, the model assumes that all individuals are equal in 
their ability to perform entrepreneurial as well as normal labour functions. The results show that 
more risk adverse individuals become workers, while less risk adverse become entrepreneurs; Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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the equilibrium wage is a sort of premium for risk aversion, and less risk adverse entrepreneurs 
run larger firms. The allocation of labour to firms and the number of firms are not optimal due 
to inefficiencies cause by institutional constraints in risk trading. 
If Knight’s work and subsequent developments identify in the capability of treating 
uncertainty a crucial determinant of the entrepreneurial decision, according to alternative 
perspectives mere differences in risk aversion cannot explain the special role of entrepreneurs 
because independent risks can be insured by means of capital markets. These approaches assign 
the entrepreneur the role of coping with the unknown, i.e. to “produce an effort to get things 
done” but especially to deal with “unforeseen events”, two functions that are related to potential 
situations of asymmetric information where risk can fail to be assured (Chamley, 1983). 
The Austrian tradition, represented by Kirzner, emphasizes the role of the entrepreneur as a 
person who is “alert” to unexploited possibilities. The main role of the entrepreneur is the 
adjustment of prices: if the price prevailing in the market is not appropriate, then an opportunity 
for profit is created. Alertness to disequilibrium is the distinguishing characteristic of an 
entrepreneur. Whereas Knight identified the entrepreneur as the recipient of pure profit 
(intended as the reward for bearing the cost of uncertainty), for Kirzner the entrepreneur is able 
to perceive the opportunities and the benefits deriving from the availability of knowledge not 
apparently possessed by others. A general profit opportunity that is known to everyone and 
equally exploitable by everyone is a profit opportunity for no one in particular (Richardson, 
1960): here the determinant of the entrepreneurial choice lies in the ability to notice an 
opportunity that may have been available before but that had escaped the others’ attention. This 
alertness is a peculiar form of knowledge that cannot be obtained through a rational investment 
policy in search: entrepreneurs are profit-seeking speculators characterised by a kind of superior 
knowledge that enables them to gain from the ignorance of others. The entrepreneurial 
competition, therefore, is a process that accelerates the equilibrating adjustment process of the 
market, whereas entrepreneurs are the agents characterised by the ability to recognise market 
opportunities that are typically abundant in conditions of disequilibrium. 
Conversely, Schumpeter considers economic change as endogenously determined. The 
Kirznerian and Schumpeterian views are clearly distinct: according to the former, 
entrepreneurship is a stabilising force, while the latter considers it as a source of disequilibrium. 
It is not the exploitation of unnoticed market opportunities, but the creation of new possibilities 
that represents the real essence of the entrepreneurial behaviour in Schumpeter’s view. 
Entrepreneurs are revolutionary agents of change who identify or create new commodities, new 
technologies, new sources of supply, new types of organization (Schumpeter, 1942) and acts as 
the catalyst which loosens some transactional bonds and forges new ones. According to Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is an extraordinary person who brings about extraordinary events: 
the entrepreneur is a revolutionary, an innovator overturning tried and tested convention and 
producing novelty. Such boldness and confidence require aptitudes that only a small fraction of 
the population holds: the entrepreneurial decision rests on the genius, the personality and the 
talent of the innovator-entrepreneur. 
In a more recent work, Minniti (2004) recalls Kirzner’s idea of in alertness and treats it as a 
crucial factor, together with asymmetric information, in shaping individuals’ entrepreneurial 
decision: more alert agents have higher probabilities of exhibiting entrepreneurial behaviour. A 
notion that exhibit some similarities is the one introduced by Shackle (1970), who argued that 
the entrepreneur is an individual who has the ability of “imagining” a possible future state of 
affairs, not only “perceiving” an existing one. Therefore, opportunities may have not an 
objective existence independent of their discoverer, but spring from the entrepreneur’s 
imagination. 
Summing up, theories that assign the entrepreneur non-routine functions recognize in him 
the presence of very peculiar personal traits: attitude in coping with uncertainty for Knight, 
alertness for Kirzner, creativeness for Schumpeter, imagination for Shackle. The determinants 
of the entrepreneurial decisions do not lie in the expectation of maximizing a wealth depending 
on the characteristics of a temporary disequilibrium of the market, but in the individual 
manifestation of specific attitudes. These traits might be linked  to an agent’s preferences (as 
happens for their willingness to bear risk) or to his ability in making use of information. 
In their efforts to define a distinctive domain for the field of entrepreneurship, however, 
researchers has recently shifted the attention away from approaches that tried to identify 
personal determinants of the entrepreneurial choice toward the comprehension of  the “nexus of 
enterprising individuals and valuable opportunities” (Venkataraman, 1997). This new focus has 
required scholars to explain the role of opportunities in the entrepreneurial process. Following 
Casson (1982) and Shane and Venkataraman (2000), entrepreneurial opportunities can be 
defined as situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, markets and organizing 
methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends or mean-ends 
relationships. While non-entrepreneurial decisions involve the creation and identification of new 
means and ends, entrepreneurial decisions involve the creation or identification of previously 
undetected or unutilized ones. Eckhardt and Shane (2000) argue that there exist three valuable 
ways of categorizing opportunities: by the locus of the changes that generate the opportunity; by 
the source of the opportunities themselves; by the initiator of the change. In their opinion, this 
kind of analysis represents a shifting from the ‘entrepreneurial type’ paradigm – that is rooted in 
implicit assumptions about differences between entrepreneurs and other types of people – to a Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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paradigm of entrepreneurship that is embedded in the concept of disequilibrium and incomplete 
information about opportunities. An opportunity-based perspective provides researchers with a 
general framework that is able to explain many parts of the entrepreneurial process. Moreover, it 
indicates that much of the entrepreneurial process depends heavily on factors beyond the control 
of individual entrepreneur. 
Casson devoted a lot of effort in studying entrepreneurship and provided a possible synthesis 
of the issues that are crucial to understand the entrepreneurial decision. In one of his most recent 
works (Casson, 2003), he argues that “the theory of entrepreneurship is a necessary element in 
any comprehensive synthesis of theories of the firm”. Entrepreneurship can be analysed by 
extending orthodox modelling techniques; the defining characteristic of the entrepreneur is 
specialization in judgemental decision making. The entrepreneur differs not only in terms of 
risk aversion (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) but also in their access to information, and 
consequently in the subjective probabilities he attaches when assessing risk. Focusing on 
judgement, Casson emphasizes the crucial reason why the theory of entrepreneurship has 
diverged from the neoclassical approach: he recognizes the importance of “volatility in the 
environment”. The environment is continuously affected by the presence of shocks; if shocks 
are specific in influencing a particular individual, firm or market, information must be gathered 
by people specializing in a particular field of activity.  Central is the idea of judgemental 
decision, “where different individuals, sharing the same objectives and acting under similar 
circumstances, would make different decisions”. Agents make different decision because they 
have “different access to information, or different interpretation of it”. An entrepreneur would 
be a person whose judgement inevitably diverges form others: whereas Kirzner saw the 
entrepreneur as gradually coming to perceive the opportunities latent in given circumstances, 
Casson depicts him as spotting and evaluating some of the opportunities thrown up as 
circumstances change. 
This branch of literature on entrepreneurship tries to devote a higher level of attention to the 
specific characteristics an entrepreneur displays. Such an interest allows to provide a less static 
and simplified framework with respect to previous studies on entrepreneurship. However, the 
existence of an “entrepreneurial personality” whose behavior is presumed to be constant 
regardless of the situation has often been criticized (e.g. Shaver, 1995). Furthermore, the 
critique that can be moved to the entrepreneurship literature - in both the lines we have 
investigated - is the generalized inattention to study the entrepreneurial determinants as 
specifically related to the industry where the entrepreneurial decision takes place and the 
moment when it occurs. The industrial organization literature offers important contributions to 
overcome this limit. Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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4. The entrepreneurial decision as an “entry” decision 
Industrial organization literature conceptualizes the entrepreneurial decision as the entry of a 
new firm into a market: more specifically, Mueller (1991) refers to a “firm that supplies a 
product within an industry without having supplied it previously”. According to the neoclassical 
theory, entry plays a re-equilibrating function and represents “a transition toward the 
equilibrium” (Garavaglia, 2004): when an industry exhibits extra-profits with respect of the 
market long-run equilibrium (where entry does not occur), new firms come in and “erode” these 
rents, in a picture that exhibits strong similarities with the first block of theories about 
entrepreneurship. The probability of entry is negatively affected by the presence of barriers that 
might prevent potential entrants to exploit profitable market opportunities and allow incumbent 
firms to earn super-profits. Thus, it is industry characteristics, both in terms of industry 
profitability and in terms of the level of structural or behavioural barriers, that determine or not 
a firm’s entry decision. Firms are here assumed to be homogeneous with respect to their cost 
functions and to the amount of information they are provided with. Subsequent refinements 
introduce strategic interaction among newcomers and incumbent, but still depict entry as a 
profit-driven phenomenon. 
The evolutionary approach grounds on the concept of “technological regime” (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) and shift the attention on the technological attributes of the industrial 
environment: appropriability of the innovative rents, cumulativeness of technological advance, 
level of technological opportunities and characteristics of knowledge (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996). Therefore, we cannot generalize the understanding of the process of entry disregarding 
the technological features of the industry: some technological conditions favour entry more than 
others, as the industry might evolve in a direction that widens the spectrum of available 
opportunities and competences required or deepens the existing ones. Analogously, Audretsch 
(1995) suggests two possible models describing industry evolution: the “revolving door” that 
captures high turbulence and difficulty in surviving (and correspond to Nelson and Winter’s 
“routinized regime”), and the “metaphor of the forest” where new entrants displace established 
firms that grounded their roots in the industry and force them to exit (as in the “entrepreneurial 
regime”). 
Focussing on another level of analysis, studies on the industry life cycle (e.g. Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996) emphasize the importance of considering the stage of 
evolution of the industry. Grounding on previous works by Abernathy and Utterback (1978), 
this kind of analysis stresses the fact that entry is much easier in early stages of evolution: a 
radical innovation gives birth to a new industry, entry barriers are low and product innovations Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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frequent. As the industry evolves toward the maturity, output considerably grows, the number of 
versions of the product decline and more investment is devoted to process innovation: barriers 
to entry become significant, entry rates decrease and a shakeout in the number of producers 
occurs. 
Interestingly, the population ecology approach (Carrol and Hannan, 1995; Carroll, 1997), 
although belonging to the sociological area, offers an alternative interpretation that has engaged 
a fruitful dialogue with the economic evolutionary theory: in this framework, however, an 
organization’s entry choice is determined on the basis of forces of sociological nature. The 
“legitimization” effect plays a crucial role in affecting the viability of a given organisational 
form and its diffusion. The difficulties associated with the novelty of the beginning are 
overcome as time passes by, but the presence of a higher number of organisations implies a 
tough competition such that entry becomes less and less attractive. 
Within this approach, the “resource partitioning model” helps in making sense of the 
increase in the number of entrants that might occur in mature industries (which usually exhibit 
high concentration rates). When industry’s concentration is high, there is more room in terms of 
resources for new organisations (e.g. Carroll, 1985; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992) that are 
typically small and assume a different organisational form from the prevalent one in the 
industry: big generalist producers leave some resource space free for small specialist producers, 
whose entry choice is therefore more favourable when the industry is mature. 
Another bunch of models in industrial organization focuses on the role of information and 
uncertainty in affecting the entry decision. The essence of the decision to enter lies in firms’ 
willingness to discover their own true efficiency level that determines the probability of 
surviving and prospering. A model in which uncertainty represents a key ingredient in the 
explanation of entry is suggested by Jovanovic (1982): firms do not know exactly how good 
their own capabilities are: by means of a mechanism of “noisy selection” some of them are 
discovered to be more efficient than others, survive and prosper while less efficient ones decline 
and exit. 
In a similar flavour, Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode (2001)’s model shows the relevance 
of uncertainty and information disclosure in determining entrants’ decision. After observing 
other firms’ performances, potential entrants reduce their uncertainty: the larger the number of 
firms in the market, the wider information available to potential entrants and the higher the 
frequency of entry choices, that is governed by a self-reinforcing mechanism. 
Many contributions in industrial organization therefore succeeds in pointing out that 
entrepreneurial decision is idiosyncratic to the industry and the moment when it occurs. The 
theories that account for these aspects find higher confirmation in data about entry. Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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Recently, industrial economics theories have tried to integrate the analysis of entry 
determinants related to the industrial structure with an investigation of the biases and limitations 
that can affect firms’ decision. In fact, potential entrants’ expectations of success determine 
entry choice, but these expectations may be affected by mistakes that concern one’s own 
abilities and probability of success. The most famous contribution is represented by Camerer 
and Lovallo (1999)’s paper that stresses the importance of overconfidence in leading the entry 
decision and shows that entrants are able to predict the amount of competitors correctly, but lack 
in evaluating their performance with respect to their peers. Not only they overestimate their 
capabilities, but also seem to reason as they were alone in the competitive arena (“reference 
group neglect” phenomenon). This work opened up a strand of literature that involves 
psychological insights to understand the entry decision (e.g. Grieco and Hogarth, 2004; More 
and Cain, 2004). Several studies show how entrepreneurs failures in intuitive reasoning may 
play a part in the findings of a number of recent studies in entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs seem 
to be affected by cognitive biases like the ones qualified as heuristics by Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky (1982). Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988), among others, show that entrepreneurs 
perceive their prospects for success as substantially better than those for similar businesses. 
Moreover, their degree of optimism appears to be higher if they have already made the 
commitment to become business owners: the theory of cognitive dissonance studies decision 
makers’ attitude to bolster or exaggerate the attractiveness of an option after it has been chosen 
(Abelson and Levi, 1985). 
Thus, the determinants of entry should concern not only the features of the industry where it 
takes place (observed in a specific moment), but also the way entrants frame their decision and 
the possible distortions affecting them. 
In general, however, the industrial organization approach does not investigate properly the 
motivational mechanism behind the entrepreneurial choice. This could be due only by trying to 
understand the way how a potential entrepreneur frames his decision. Is a new business an 
opportunity to invest some money or a new career chance? Conceiving the decision in a manner 
or in another has important implication in shaping its determinants: the following sections shed 
more light on this issue. 
5. The entrepreneurial decision as an “investment” decision 
A few works belonging to the financial area conceptualize the entrepreneurial decision as a 
particular case of real business investment. Investment is usually a macro concept, studied at 
integrated level: in elementary macroeconomic models, the private investment flow plays a Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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crucial role in connecting real markets and monetary markets. Aggregate investment depends on 
individual firm’s choice: since in orthodox neoclassical theories macroeconomics and 
microeconomics are not distinctly different disciplines, analyzing macroeconomic investment is 
analytically identical to analyzing microeconomic investment, because both theories describe 
profit maximizing behaviour of firms balancing their marginal costs and benefits. 
If a firm can instantaneously and costlessly adjust its capital stock, then - as in Jorgenson 
(1963)’s seminal work - its decision about how much capital to use is a static decision where the 
marginal product of capital is equated to the user cost of capital. The investment literature, 
however, has emphasized the presence of two types of frictions: adjustment costs and 
irreversibility. The adjustment cost literature (e.g. Eisner and Strotz, 1963) assumes the 
adjustment cost function to be strictly convex and have a value of zero at zero investment. In the 
1970s and 1980s, this literature merged with the literature on Tobin’s q (Tobin, 1969), that is 
centred on the fact that the optimal rate of investment is an increasing function of the ratio of the 
firm’s market value and the replacement cost of firm’s capital. Mussa (1977) and Abel (1982) 
argued that the optimal rate of investment is the rate that equates the marginal adjustment cost 
to the marginal value of installed capital (marginal q). 
On the other hand, the fact that investment might be irreversible represents another type of 
friction affecting the investment decision. Irreversibility makes investment especially sensitive 
to various form of risk, such as uncertainty over the future product prices and operating costs 
that determine cash flows, uncertainty over future interest rates, and uncertainty over the cost 
and timing of the investment itself. An investment is made a sunk cost by the fact that capital is 
firm or industry specific, so that it cannot be used productively elsewhere. Dixit (1989) 
investigates entry (and exit) decisions as forms of investment (and disinvestment) that occur in 
an environment characterized by uncertainty. Hysteresis, defined as the failure to reverse an 
effect when its causes have been reverted, is the main feature in this setup. Pyndick (1991) and 
Dixit and Pyndick (1994) emphasize the analogy between real and financial investment 
decisions and conceptualize the opportunity of making an irreversible investment as a call 
option on a stock that consists of the capital in place. Standard financial economics techniques 
are used to find the “price of the option” (i.e. the value of the entry opportunity for the firm) and 
the rule concerning the “optimal timing of exercising the option” (i.e. the optimal timing of 
entering) after which the option to enter is “killed”: the investor gives up the possibility of 
waiting for new information that might influence the appeal of this investment itself. 
Performing an irreversible investment in the creation of a new firm when payoffs are stochastic 
means sacrificing the option to invest in the future: to maximize profits, therefore, one must 
balance the profits foregone by delaying entry against the option value relinquished when entry Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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has occurred (Lambrecht and Perraudin, 2003). This might imply that the optimal entry timing 
turns to occur later than the first date when the present discounted value of future cash flow 
exceeds zero. Intuition suggests that an idle firm will enter when demand condition become 
sufficiently favourable, and an active firm will abandon when they become sufficiently adverse. 
Dixit (1989) shows that the optimal strategy for this kind of investment and abandonment will 
take the form of two threshold prices. In most real-world situations, the demand and cost 
conditions a firm faces change all the time, and the firm must make its entry and exit decisions 
taking into account that the future is uncertain. 
Thus, according to this approach, it’s the information that entrepreneurs can acquire by 
observing an uncertain environment – like price reflecting demand or supply conditions - that 
turns to be crucial as entrepreneurial decision’s determinant and stimulate it in a specific 
moment. Thus, when the entrepreneurial decision is explicitly analysed, and framed as 
investment decision, contextual factors play a major role. The next section will show how 
motivational factors might become crucial when the entrepreneurial decision is perceived as a 
career choice. 
6. The entrepreneurial decision as a “self-employment” decision 
Literature in labour economics has devoted a lot of effort in investigating the entrepreneurial 
decision, that has been conceptualized as “self-employment”. Since Osborne (1976), these 
works have depicted the entrepreneurship decision as involving the choice between two income 
streams: a rational individual can decide to accept a wage position earning a certain amount of 
money per year, or go into business with the anticipation of receiving a share of profits. 
According to the definition prevailing in labour-market statistics, self-employment does not 
correspond exactly to entrepreneurship because self-employed are not necessarily innovative 
entrepreneurs pursuing growth enhancing business projects. However, the two phenomena can 
be considered equivalent with a good level of approximation: also the literature exhibits some 
overlapping. 
The proliferation of econometric works investigating the determinants of self-employment 
has been motivated by the sharp increase in self-employment that occurred in Europe, in the 
United States and in Canada in the Seventies and Eighties, after a downward trend that had 
persistently characterized the period 1910-1970 (Fairlie and Meyer, 2000). This stylized fact 
strongly suggests that a change of fundamental nature had occurred in the advanced industrial 
economies that made self-employment more attractive. Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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Possible explanations have initially concerned: the presence of changes in an industrial 
structure that previously had bolstered industries in which small firms were viable and scale 
economies relatively unimportant; prices shifts in favour of industries where self-employment 
was relatively common; rising marginal tax rates in a context where the ease of underreporting 
income is higher for self-employment; increased wage rigidity that rationed a proportion of paid 
workers out of wage jobs; rising real retirement benefits that allowed to obtain higher flexibility 
and “partially retire”. Among these, Blau (1987) shows empirically that changes in industrial 
structure and technology are the most important determinants of the rising of self-employment. 
Parker (1996) summarizes the explanations of this fact into two categories. The first views self-
employment as the outcome of adverse conditions in the paid employment sector (“recession 
push” theories). In contrast, scholars may emphasize the presence of pull factors in the supply 
side of the economy: lower tax rates, greater ease of hiring and firing and “rejuvenated 
entrepreneurial spirit” (Hughes, 1992). Both push and pull theories emphasize the returns from 
self-employment as being of central importance. 
Hamilton (2000) tried to classify models explaining the self-employment choice that were 
based on the assumption of wealth maximization in three categories. First, investment and 
agency models (e.g. Lazear, 1981; Lazear and Moore, 1984) claim that self-employment 
differentials derive from differences in earning profiles across sectors. While the expected 
present value of self-employment income is equal to the paid employment alternative for the 
marginal worker, a cross-sectional earning differential may exist as a result of sectoral 
differences in earnings or in the experience profile due to the patterns of career earnings’ growth 
in paid and self-employment. The investment model argues that the self-employment earning 
profile will be steeper than those in paid employment because human and capital investment are 
not shared with an employer in self-employment. On the contrary, agency models explain paid 
employment’s steeper earning profiles referring to the need of discourage shirking since agency 
problems are not present in self-employment. 
Second, matching and learning models (e.g. Roy, 1951; Jovanovic, 1982) emphasize that 
earning differences arise from differences in sector-specific abilities. Individuals have 
unobserved, time-invariant, sector-specific abilities and human capital: earning differential 
therefore may reflect selection effects that cause workers choose the sector where they have a 
relative advantage (individuals may understand immediately which sector they have to match 
with or, due to uncertainty, they may need a certain time to learn it), and low-ability 
entrepreneurs are expected to drop out of self-employment. 
Finally, “superstar” theory (Rosen, 1981) argues that the comparison between self-
employment and paid work can be significantly influenced by a handful of high income Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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entrepreneurial superstars. Small differences in skills might be magnified into large disparities 
in returns in labour market characterized by imperfect substitution among different sellers and 
in which the costs of production do not rise in the same proportion of the size of a seller’s 
market. MacDonald (1988) demonstrates that, as in the learning models, workers who realize 
they are not “rising stars” tend to return to paid employment. 
However, expected monetary earnings can turn to be insufficient to explain self-
employment. As Hamilton (2000) emphasizes, differences in non-pecuniary aspects may lead to 
compensating earning effects for equally productive workers. A popular view is that 
entrepreneurship offers a higher level of freedom in the work environment, that can be 
translated into the possibility of being “one’s own boss”. Evans and Leighton (1989) show that 
individuals preferring higher autonomy are more likely to become self-employed. Conversely, 
Kanbur (1982) emphasizes the role of risk-aversion in the self-employment decision: business 
owners may earn a risk premium because of the higher uncertainty in their earnings. Risks may 
have a temporal structure, so that the entrepreneurial decision is influenced by impatience 
levels: by entering a risky activity an agent can acquire information about his ability, which is 
useful for future occupational choice. In equilibrium, risk-taking has the characteristics of 
postponed gain relative to the safe alternative, so that in environment with lower time rates of 
discount more risk taking activities will be observed. 
Still drawing upon Knight (1921)’s notion that individuals respond to risk-adjusted relative 
earnings, Rees and Shah (1986) carry out an exhaustive empirical work in the aim of shading 
further light on the binary choice between self-employment and paid work. Self-employment is 
generally regarded as being more risky since, on average, the coefficient of variation of self-
employment earnings is over three times that for paid-employed earnings. Another important 
determinant, however, is given by the nature of the work involved. The attractions of self-
employment are the flexibility and the independence entailed; on the other hand, self-
employment usually implies a larger number of working hours and a higher level of 
responsibility, so that it can be mentally and physically more demanding. Moreover, education 
affects the choice primarily by reducing the coefficient of variation in self-employment 
earnings: in fact, education serves as a filter such that the more educated are more likely to be 
uniform in their abilities; furthermore, they tend to be better informed, implying an higher 
efficiency when assessing self-employment opportunities. Concerning the influence of age, data 
show that there exists a tendency for employees to switch to self-employment towards the end 
of their working life as an alternative to retirement (Quinn, 1980); however, the old can be less 
likely to take risk than the young. Health is expected to affect elf-employment trough work Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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characteristics: the longer hours and the higher responsibility imply that the less healthy might 
find the self-employment status too demanding. 
A peculiar distinction is proposed by Kuhn and Schuetze (2001), who investigated the 
reasons why self-employment had risen dramatically in Canada in the period 1982-1998. Using 
data on flows (not on stocks) that provided cues on the causes of changes, they found out a 
gender effect in the entrepreneurial choice. In fact, men’s increase in self-employment is 
associated with a decrease in permanence with high jobs, whereas women’s increase is related 
to higher survival rates in self-employment. Their results also emphasized the fact that general 
labour market conditions play a more relevant role in explaining the changes in women and 
men’s transition probabilities than changes in observable demographic conditions, such as age, 
education, and immigration. 
Another occupational choice story is the one suggested by Jovanovic (1979), who sustains 
the idea that age is a crucial determinant because individuals tend to try riskier occupations such 
as entrepreneurship when they are younger. However, entrepreneurship may not be a feasible 
option for younger people because they have had less time to build the capital needed to start a 
business. This liquidity constraint, together with other significant categories of internal and 
external limitations that may affect the entrepreneurial decision, will be discussed in depth in 
the following section. 
Summing up, theories in labour economics frame the entrepreneurial choice as a career 
choice, and this argument has heavy implications in terms of the attention that is devoted to 
motivational aspects of the decision. The interest in personal characteristics recalls the idea of 
the importance of personal traits in entrepreneurship theory, but here personality features are 
interpreted more explicitly as engines of entrepreneurial choice and involve more complex 
considerations than what follows from considering the entrepreneurial choice as a form of 
investment. 
7. Constraints affecting the entrepreneurial decision 
After examining how different strands of literature have conceptualized the entrepreneurial 
decision, and which determinants have been identified as crucial across the selected approaches, 
we need to pay attention to the constraints that might limit entrepreneurs’ in making their own 
choice. These constraints can concern the availability of (financial) assets and the external and 
institutional environment, in terms of policies, reforms, or geographical localization. 
Our discussion about the limitations to the entrepreneurial choice starts from a stylized fact. 
The International Social Survey Program of 1999 revealed that a large proportion of individuals Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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(more that 50% on average across countries) express an apparent preference for being an 
entrepreneur instead of being an employee: however, the actual proportion of self-employed 
people in the same countries is approximately 15%. So, why such a large fraction of workers do 
not follow their apparent desire to run their own business? 
Theoretical literature (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988) explains how credit rationing can 
emerge even in a world where agents are optimizing. Consequently, many econometric studies 
have tested the hypothesis that capital market constraints may be an important determinant of 
the decision to become an entrepreneur: some initial capital is required for establishing the new 
firm and perspective entrepreneurs are price-takers in the credit market, so that the possibility to 
obtain capital, and then to become entrepreneur, depends not only on a vector of personal 
attributes (affecting the utility achieved when the individual is a wage earner or self-employed) 
but also on an individual’s asset. Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) try to give reason to the 
previous puzzle by investigating the factors that might be important in determining who 
becomes entrepreneur: studying British data, they find out that a crucial impediment is lack of 
capital. Evidence about gifts and inheritances shows that individuals who have received a sum 
of money are more likely to run their own business. Analogously, Lindh and Ohisson (1996) 
exploit Swedish micro-data to investigate the positive effect of a windfall gain such as a lottery 
winning or an inheritance on the probability of becoming self-employed. Similarly, Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfain and Rosen (1994) use the receipt of an inheritance as a “natural experiment” to 
evaluate potential entrepreneurs’ behaviour when a lump sum of capital is received: if owning a 
significant stock of capital is important to establish an enterprise, individuals who received an 
inheritance are expected to have a higher probability to start a new business. Their results show 
that the size of inheritance affects significantly the likeliness of becoming an entrepreneur and 
the amount of capital employed in the new enterprise. 
Recent family business literature (e.g. Romano, Tanewski and Smyrnios, 2000) points out 
that firms’ owner financing decisions are crucially influenced by the firm owner’s attitudes 
towards the utility of debt as a form of funding, that however is moderated by external 
environmental conditions. Small family business and owners who do not have formal planning 
processes in place tend to rely on family loans as a source of support: this finding can be 
explained referring to Sonnenfeld and Spence (1989)’s idea that family business owners are 
averse to debt and by the possibility of large losses in case of loan failure. Small family firms’ 
reliance on family loans and debt might be related to owners’ interest in retaining control and 
choosing to establish limits on gearing because of risk factors and belief that stock exchange 
might be disadvantageous. However, Mullins and Forlani (2005) show that “entrepreneurs are 
more prone to choose new ventures that have higher likelihood of loss when the venture is Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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funded with other people’s money”: the use of other people’s money can make entrepreneurs 
more likely to choose more uncertain ventures. 
Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) emphasize the importance of intergenerational links not only 
from a financial point of view: parents transmit their offsprings valuable work experience, 
reputation, and other components of human capital in general. In this flavour, Lentz and Laband 
(1990) show that the probability that a young man is self-employed is significantly higher when 
his father is self-employed. 
Entrepreneurship research has paid little attention to the context (especially in terms of 
institutions and of the policies implemented) in which new business are started. As firm’s 
ownership is significant in accounting for aggregate wealth accumulation and distribution 
(Gentry and Hubbard, 1999; Quadrini, 1999), the entrepreneurial decision turns out to be 
significantly constrained by the specific tax policy selected (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). 
Whereas a proportional tax with a full loss offset does not influence the entrepreneurial decision 
when the entrepreneur is a risk-neutral individual, a progressive tax with an imperfect loss offset 
might discourage entry: higher convexity on tax schedule, in fact, raises the tax burden. 
Tan (2004) develops a stage model to examine how changes in organizational environment 
can affect the decision to become an entrepreneur. The turbulent but uninterrupted transition 
that occurred in China from 1978 to 2002 provided a unique opportunity to verify that business 
environment became more conducive to entrepreneurial activity. Socio-political continuity 
across the transition allowed entrepreneurs to move along the learning curve gradually and raise 
entrepreneurs’ commitments in risk-taking and innovation. This study shows how gradual 
reforms can be politically preferred to dramatic reforms in determining entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to commit to future growth and make more innovative and risk-oriented decisions. 
Similarly, Minniti (2004) emphasizes the important role played by institutions and argues 
that entrepreneurial behaviour and entrepreneurship rate may depend less on individuals’ 
characteristics and more on relationships among individuals, that are regulated by institutions 
themselves. Political and institutional settings are more conductive to the entrepreneurial choice 
when they succeed in producing a jump strong enough to push the community in the desired 
direction; moreover, institutions and routines are difficult to modify in time and the 
entrepreneurial attitude is contingent on the history of the considered community. 
In another recent study, Minniti (2005) investigates the reasons why entrepreneurship 
flourishes in some reasons and not in others: the Silicon Valley, Boston’s Route 128, 
BadenWurttemberg and Emilia-Romagna (Italian districts) are just a few examples of the fact 
that entrepreneurial activity tends to cluster geographically. Local social environment is crucial 
to understand the determinants of the entrepreneurial decision (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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Granovetter, 1985). As an entrepreneurial venture requires the introduction of innovation and 
the handling of multiple tasks in an ambiguous environment (March and Olsen, 1976), potential 
entrepreneurs benefit of the observation of other entrepreneurs through which they can acquire 
information and skills, for instance concerning how to find competent employees, inputs, 
financial support, potential buyers an so on. Furthermore, the presence of a significant number 
of entrepreneurs legitimates their activity and enables them to exploit established routines. 
When making decision in an unknown environment, agents base their choices on “social 
cues”(Aldrich, 1999), and participation in social networks is a crucial element for entrepreneurs 
(Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). As perceptions about the desirability of becoming entrepreneurs 
are formed on the basis of the available information set, the social network of an individuals 
turns to affect the part of that set that is collected locally. Minniti (2005) models this influence 
as a network externality in which entrepreneurship exhibits increasing returns with respect to 
adoption: entrepreneurship “creates a culture of itself that influences individual behaviour on its 
favour”. 
Another determinant of a region’s vitality is represented by the presence of spin-offs 
(Klepper, 2002), i.e. firms that are founded by employees of incumbent firms in the same sector 
and area. In some industry, “spin-offs are legion” (Klepper and Thompson, 2005), and a 
possible explanation of this occurrence lies on the level of disagreement that may emerge within 
strongly hierarchical structures in decision making. 
8. Discussion 
The purpose of this paper consists of providing an integrated investigation of the 
determinants of the entrepreneurial decision. We claim that literature belonging to the 
entrepreneurship field may be insufficient to generate a comprehensive framework of this issue. 
The entrepreneurial decision can be conceived also as the entry of the firm leaded by the 
entrepreneur into an industry, as a peculiar form of real investment, as a career choice in favour 
of self-employment: the entrepreneurial phenomenon can be understood in its wholeness only 
taking into account all these contributions that have limits, but also might add fruitful insights. 
Thus, after discussing who is the entrepreneur and who he is not, different strands of literature 
within the economic approach have been reviewed. The determinants that each perspective 
identifies as crucial in affecting the entrepreneurial choice are obviously idiosyncratic to that 
perspective itself. Industrial organization assesses a crucial role to the industrial structure, 
whereas finance looks at the uncertain matching between market conditions, and labour 
economics focuses on individuals’ evaluation of possible career patterns. The three Daniela Grieco, The entrepreneurial decision: theories, determinants and constraints 
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perspectives, however, present several nuances: a transversal analysis can be carried out in the 
aim of distinguishing between internal and contextual determinants of the entrepreneurial 
choice. 
The literature explicitly related to entrepreneurship has been classified according to decision 
making criteria as well: in the aim of improving tractability, theories have been grouped on the 
basis of the fact that a part of them (the older ones) assign the entrepreneur only routine 
functions concerned with coordination, while the other attributes a non-ordinary role to the 
entrepreneur, who should exhibit peculiar personal traits linked to his preferences or inferential 
skills. The former group sheds light on the contextual determinants of the entrepreneur’s choice: 
the entrepreneurial decision is stimulated by the entrepreneur’s expectation of maximizing 
wealth in dependence of the possibility of optimally allocating resources; the latter focuses on 
the characteristics of the “entrepreneurial type” and consequently on internal aspects. The 
synthesis operated by scholars like Casson in shifting the accent on the relationship between 
agents’ incomplete information and market opportunities allows to account for both demand and 
supply of entrepreneurship. 
Conversely, the industrial organization literature stresses the importance of studying the 
entrepreneurial decision starting from the features of a specific industry in a definite moment of 
its evolution. There emerges a demand of entrepreneurial services in dependence of the level of 
profit opportunities and entry barriers, the peculiar technological regime that describes that 
industry, the stage of the industry life cycle and the degree of uncertainty disclosure in that 
moment. More recent contributions have been enriched with the investigation of the internal 
characteristics of entrepreneurs, especially in terms of the cognitive biases that may drive the 
entry decision, often against the dictates of a fully rational behaviour. 
Contextual determinants play a major role also in the financial approach, that looks at the 
entrepreneurial choice within the real business investment framework. Entrepreneurs make their 
decisions on the basis of the signals deriving from indicators of market condition. 
Finally, we have examined the way how labour market models conceive the entrepreneurial 
decision. When reasoning about their career, individuals both consider internal and external 
factors. Industrial structure (in terms of the possibilities of exploiting economies of scale or not, 
the occurrence of price shifts, the movements in tax rate and the condition of flexibility of 
wages) has been traditionally identified as a determinant of a choice in favour of self-
employment. However, literature in labour economics emphasizes the need of going beyond 
macroeconomic conditions and sectoral specific earnings when evaluating the form of 
employment selected: the analysis of internal factors provides interesting insights as it suggests Liuc Papers n. 207, ottobre 2007 
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of looking at the need of flexibility and independence when deciding in favour of an 
entrepreneurial career. 
Since the number of persons that actually become entrepreneurs is considerably lower that 
the amount of people who declare to wish to be self-employed, the analysis is completed with 
an enquiry concerning the constraints that may limit the entrepreneurial choice. The more 
relevant impact appears to be caused by financial constraints. However, also environmental 
conditions like the characteristics of institutions, policies and geographical localization play an 
important role. 
9. Conclusions 
The decision of becoming entrepreneur can be understood in all its components only if the 
perspective of analysis accounts for the alternative ways of conceiving it that the economic 
thought offers. The paper emphasizes the need of relating each characterization of the 
entrepreneurial decision within the circumstance where it takes place, and purposes a 
classification of this choice’s determinants based on the distinctions between internal and 
contextual factors. Among the most relevant aspects shaping the entrepreneurial decision, we 
discuss the role of “internal determinants” like personal traits, biased perceptions of success, 
desire of independence and flexibility that shape the supply-side of the phenomenon. 
Conversely, “contextual determinants” are represented by market opportunities to earn profits, 
industry and timing specific structural features, presence of signals concerning market 
conditions, environmental contingences related to prices, taxes and wages. The final section is 
devoted to the constraints that may limit the action of the previously discussed determinants. 
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